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Abstract:
In this paper we present simulation results for multi-agent models of economic systems. We
interpret the stationary distributions of wealth and focus on measuring their inequality with the
Gini coefficient. We introduce saving propensity of the agents both global and individual. In the first
case, we find that inequality decreases with an increasing saving propensity and that the distribution
of wealth evolves to a gamma distribution. An analogy is then made with the kinetic theory model
and its equilibrium Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. In the second case, the equilibrium distribution
is found to have an incipient power-law tail. We also add a redistribution of wealth mechanism based
on taxes and evaluate the reduction of wealth inequality that it entails. Last, we study a model with
dynamic saving propensity rates and a mechanism that rewards those trades in which significant
wealth is brought into play.
I. INTRODUCTION
The nature of economic inequality and the distribu-
tion of wealth in society has been an issue of research for
economists and sociologists for a long time but also for
physicists in the last decades. More than a century ago,
Vilfredo Pareto quantified the high-end of the income dis-
tribution in a society and found it to follow a power law
P (m) ∼ m−ν−1 . After him, multiple other studies cor-
roborated this result obtaining values of ν ranging from
1 to 3 [1–4] . In the last two decades, research in the field
of Econophysics has been intense and a number of mod-
els have been proposed to try to explain the functioning
principles of trading systems. Many of these use a statis-
tical mechanics approach: they make an analogy between
a closed economic system in which agents perform pair-
wise money-conservative transactions and an ideal gas in
which gas molecules exchange energy in pairwise colli-
sions.
A pioneer model developed by Dragulescu and
Yakovenko in 2000 [5] showed that if we let such a sys-
tem of economic agents perform multiple arbitrary and
random sharing but locally conserving transactions, the
wealth distribution goes to the well-known equilibrium
Gibbs’ equilibrium distribution of statistical mechanics.
A few years later, Chatterjee et. al. upgraded this
model by letting agents save a part of their wealth deter-
mined by a saving propensity rate parameter [1]. This
and multiple subsequent studies found that when this
parameter is the same for all agents, the wealth distri-
butions in equilibrium go to gamma-shaped distributions
[4, 6, 7]. Otherwise, when the saving propensity is not
global but assumed to behave randomly, the higher end
of the wealth distribution is found to follow the Pareto
power law decay [6]. Furthermore, Manna et. al. showed
that this observed Pareto law is essentially a convolution
of the single agent distributions [8].
In this study, we present the results of the simulations
of the mentioned models in sections II and III.
Further, with the goal of finding ways to reduce eco-
nomic inequality, we developed a model which imple-
ments a wealth redistribution system based on taxes (sec-
tion IV). Last, in section V we exhibit what we called a
learned saving propensity model and that we devised aim-
ing to come closer to what a real open economic system
is. The main difference here is that this is now a non-
conservative system. For other proposals of open systems
see [9].
Over the paper, attention is specially drawn to the
evaluation of inequality by means of the Gini coefficient.
This coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 expressing per-
fect equality and 1 expressing maximal inequality among
agents.
II. GROUNDS OF THE MODEL
We consider an ideal-gas model of a closed economic
system where total wealth W and total number of agents
N is fixed. Starting from a uniform distribution of
wealth, we let the system dynamically evolve with time
following pairwise wealth conservative transactions.
At each time step t, two agents that possess wealths
wi(t) and wj(t) are randomly picked and they perform a
transaction after which they possess wi(t+1) and wj(t+
1), respectively. The wealth is locally conserved, i.e.,
wi(t) + wj(t) = wi(t + 1) + wj(t + 1) and no debt is
allowed, i.e., wi(t) > 0.
Then, after a typical relaxation time (t ∼ 104) a time-
independent probability distribution P (w) is obtained ir-
respective of the initial distribution. We determined this
steady state by following the behaviour of the distribu-
tion every 100 steps.
Now, the trading rule applied to transactions is own of
each model and is explained in its corresponding section.
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III. SAVING PROPENSITY MODELS
Each of the two agents involved in this money conser-
vative transaction saves a fraction λ of its wealth, which
we call saving propensity rate, and trades the rest. Next,
the sum of the wealth that the two agents bring into
play is bipartitioned between them with a uniformly at
random bipartion fraction ε.
A. Global saving propensities
In this version of the model, the saving propensity rate
is the same for all agents and is fixed over time.
If i, j are the involved agents in the t-th transaction
with wealths wi(t), wj(t), their wealths after this time
step will turn to:
wi(t+ 1) = λwi(t) + ε(t)(1− λ)(wi(t) + wj(t)) (1)
wj(t+ 1) = λwj(t) + (1− ε(t))(1− λ)(wi(t) + wj(t)).
This dynamics is then followed until the system reaches
the steady state (t ∼ 104).
In our study, the simulation was run for different global
saving propensities (λ ∈ [0.1, 0.9]) obtaining equilibrium
distributions such as the ones shown in Fig. 1 (a). It is
important to clarify that this curves are an adjustment
of a histogram. For this reason, some of them slightly
exceed w = 0 which is in clear contradiction with the
fact that debt is not allowed in this model.
It is notable that the lower the global saving propen-
sity, the lower the mode of the distribution which grad-
ually shifts from 0 to 1 with increasing λ. It attracts
attention that the mode of the red curve (λ = 0.8) has a
higher probability than the other distributions with lower
λ. However, this doesn’t affect the Gini coefficient (inset
plot of Fig. 1 (a)).
Besides, when the global saving propensity is low
enough (λ ∼ 0.5), the range of wealth that the agents
reach is wide enough to encounter the barrier wi = 0.
The distributions then have a narrow initial growth upto
a most-probable value after which they fall-off with a
power-law tail. This result suggests that when the global
saving propensity is low, a few agents accumulate the
same wealth as the sum of the rest.
In agreement with this, the Gini coefficient of the dis-
tributions drops when the global saving propensity rises,
i.e, the inequality diminishes.
Additionally, the functional form of this distributions
has been successfully fitted with a gamma distribution
on the base of an analogy with the kinetic theory of
gases. This becomes clear when we express the Maxwell-















Kinetic model Economic model
variable K (kinetic energy) w (wealth)
units N particles N agents
interaction collisions trades
dimension integer D real number Dλ









f(ξ) = γD/2 f(ξ) = γD/2
TABLE I: Analogy between the kinetic model and the agent-
based model, extracted from [6].
which is a gamma distribution of the reduced variable
ξ = KkBT , i.e, f(ξ) = γD/2(ξ).
In our model, the reduced variable would be ξ = wTλ ,
with Tλ = 2 < w > /Dλ. We briefly exhibit the analogy
for the rest of the involved parameters in Table I. For a
deeper analysis of this and its derivation, see [6].
B. Individual saving propensities
In this other version of the model, each agent has a
unique saving propensity comprehended between 0 and
1. Let λi and λj be the saving propensity rates of the
two agents that participate in the t-th transaction. Then,
their wealth after this transaction will be:
wi(t+ 1) = λiwi(t) + ε(t)((1− λi)wi(t)
+(1− λj)wj(t))
wj(t+ 1) = λjwj(t) + (1− ε(t))((1− λi)wi(t)
+(1− λj)wj(t)). (3)
We initialized the simulation assigning each agent a
uniform at random saving propensity (λ ∈ (0, 1)). We
then let the system evolve to its steady state and looked
at the final wealth of four agents with equispaced saving
propensities (λt = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8). We repeated the pro-
cedure 1000 times with the same distribution of saving
propensities and plotted the distribution of the wealths
at equilibrium of these tagged agents (Fig. 1 (b)). This
gives us an idea of what is more likely going to be the
wealth of an agent with a given λi in a society with dis-
tributed saving propensities. It is notable in Fig. 1 (b)
that agents with a high saving propensity become wealth-
ier than the mean while agents with a very low saving
propensity are likely to loose all their wealth.
In addition, we averaged the equilibrium distribution
of the system over different initial sets of individual sav-
ing propensities. With a given configuration λi, we let
the system evolve until it reaches equilibrium, then a
new set of random saving propensities is assigned to all
agents, and the whole procedure is repeated 100 times.
As a result of the average over the equilibrium distribu-
tions corresponding to the various λi configurations, one
obtains a distribution with an incipient power-law tail
(Fig. 2).
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FIG. 1: (a) Equilibrium relative wealth distributions P (w̃)
(t = 104) of a system of N=300 agents with a global sav-
ing propensity λ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 for the blue, orange, green
and red curves, respectively. The inset plot shows the Gini
coefficient of the equilibrium distributions of the system with
different global saving propensities. (b) Distribution of the
equilibrium relative wealth of an agent with an individual sav-
ing propensity λi in a system where each agent has a different
saving propensity λi ∈ (0, 1). The blue, orange, green and red
curves correspond to agents with λi = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, respec-
tively.
IV. TAXATION MODELS
With the motivation of finding a way to overcome the
wealth inequality that the propensity models exhibit, we
here introduce taxes as a mechanism of wealth redistri-











FIG. 2: Distribution of wealth in the case where the saving
propensity is uniformely distributed in the range (0,1).
bution.
At each time step a part of the transacted wealth is
not bipartioned between the two participating agents but
rather partitioned equally between all of the agents. We
define this transacted wealth as:
Wtr(t) = (1− λi)wi(t) + (1− λj)wj(t). (4)
And how much of this is retained depends on the tax
rate. The simplest version of the model is that in which
the tax rate r is fixed over time and same for any trans-
action. Now, the agents participating in the t-th trans-
action see their wealth first varied by:
wi(t+ 1) = λiwi(t) + ε(t)(1− r)Wtr(t)
wj(t+ 1) = λjwj(t) + (1− ε(t))(1− r)Wtr(t). (5)
Next, the wealth collected by the taxes is redistributed
equally among all agents:
wk(t+ 1) = wk(t) + rWtr(t)/N (6)
k = 1, ...., N.
This upgrade of the saving propensity model leads to
a significant change in the final distribution, specially
when the saving propensity is sufficiently low. When so,
it is stated that the mode of the distribution is displaced
to the mean value w̃ = 1 and that the distribution is
narrowed (Fig. 3).
To evaluate the effect of varying both the saving
propensity and tax rates, we ran the simulation fixing
λ and varying r and repeated this for different λ values.
From the obtained stationary destributions we measured
the Gini coefficient and found it to decrease with increas-
ing tax rate with any saving propensity (Fig. 4). This
reinforces the statement that the inequality is reduced
when taxes are added.
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FIG. 3: Relative stationary wealth distribution when taxes
are collected (red, r = 0) and when all transactions are free
of taxes (green, r = 0.35). For this simulation, N=500 and
λ = 0.4.













FIG. 4: Gini coefficient of the stationary distributions ob-
tained for each pair of values of saving propensity λ and tax
rate r.
V. LEARNED SAVING PROPENSITY MODELS
This last model is based on the saving propensity mod-
els but it includes some upgrades that aim to make it
closer to a real economic system. From all the models
that we described, it could be argued that real economic
agents change their saving propensity over time and that
this propensity is not independent of the agents’ experi-
ence in previous transactions.
To implement this idea, we introduced a dynamic sav-
ing propensity such that in each transaction agents can
choose between two values, λ = 0.4 and λ = 0.7. We
consider that a successful choice is that which leaves the
agent in a wealthier state after the transaction.
Each agent’s first choice is made randomly. If it turns
to be a successful choice, a “point” for this rate is added
to the record of successes of this agent. In case of an
unsuccessful choice, a “point” is added for the other rate.
At each transaction, the participating agents choose the
saving propensity for which they have accumulated more
successes up to that given time step.
One can then argue that, if the wealth brought into
play in a transaction is going to be randomly biparti-
tioned, it will always be a wiser idea to choose the high
saving propensity rate.
In order to compensate this imbalance and propitiate
agents to risk a greater rate of their wealth, a reward
system was added to the model. If the transacted wealth
Wtr(t) is higher than a certain threshold Wr, the involved
agents are rewarded with an increase of this quantity by
a factor α > 1. Namely, W ′tr(t) = αWtr(t) and after this
transaction:
wi(t+ 1) = λi(t)wi(t) + ε(t)W
′
tr(t)
wj(t+ 1) = λj(t)wj(t) + (1− ε(t))W ′tr(t). (7)
It is important to note that with this reward system
the total wealth is not conserved anymore which is in
fact a closer approach to what happens in a real open
economic system.
So, hands on the simulations, there are two parame-
ters to be regulated in this model: the factor α and the
threshold Wr.
We first asserted that the introduction of the reward
factor does have the desired effect of rising the number of
0.4 saving propensity rate choices. Next we used the Gini
coefficient once again as a measure of inequality after the
introduction of the reward system. In Fig. 5, each point
corresponds to the Gini coefficient of the final rescaled
distribution obtained performing the simulations for dif-
ferent reward factors and averaging each over six reward
thresholds (Wr ∈ [0.75, 1.75]).
Two remarkable observations can be made. On the one
hand, it is plain to see that adding a reward factor aggra-
vates inequality. This rise in the Gini coefficient seems
to be a consequence of the fact that a greater reward fac-
tor enhances a higher percentage of 0.4 saving propensity
rate choices. And from the results in section III we know
that a lower saving propensity leads to wealth distribu-
tion with a higher Gini coefficient.
On the other hand, as the standard deviation of the
measures with different thresholds is small, we can say
that where we put the threshold to reward is not relevant
to the final distribution.
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FIG. 5: Gini coefficient of the equilibrium distribution when
different reward factors are applied. Each point is measured
as the averaged coefficient over six measures with equispaced
reward thresholds ranging from 0.75 to 1.75.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have simulated some multi-agent based models for
the distribution of wealth, in which wealth is exchanged
following different trading rules. We first introduced a
saving propensity parameter which allows agents to save
part of their wealth and trade with the rest. On the
one hand, we find that when this saving propensity is
global for all agents, the mode of the distribution shifts
from 0 to 1 and the Gini coefficient drops with increasing
saving propensity. On top of that, we fitted the result-
ing distributions with gamma distributions and used this
result to make an interesting analogy between our eco-
nomic system of agents exchanging wealth in trades and
the kinetic theory model in which gas molecules exchange
kinetic energy in collisions.
On the other hand, we do a random assignment of sav-
ing propensities to each agent. We find that in such a sys-
tem, agents with a higher saving propensity are likely to
accumulate more than the mean wealth in detraction of
the agents with low saving propensities. Besides, when
we average over several initial saving propensity distri-
butions, the final probability density function is found to
follow a power-law decay.
Further, we review a taxation model in which a part
of what is traded at each transaction, is redistributed
equally between all agents. We find that adding taxes to
the previous model diminishes inequality as the station-
ary distribution narrows, the mode is displaced to the
mean value and the Gini coefficient is reduced.
We finally study a model where the saving propen-
sity of agents is dynamic: agents learn from their pre-
vious transactions and can choose wether they have a
high or low saving propensity. Also in this model, if the
wealth exchanged in a transaction is higher than a given
threshold, the involved agents are rewarded increasing
this quantity by a so-called reward factor. What the re-
sults of this model show is that the Gini coefficient rises
when this reward factor is introduced, i.e., it is a source
of inequality.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Miquel Montero for his guidance and
advice and to my family and friends for their uncondi-
tional support.
[1] A. Chakraborti and B. K. Chakrabarti, ”Statistical me-
chanics of money: How saving propensity affects its dis-
tribution”, . Eur. Phys. J. B 17, 167–170 (2000)
[2] A. Chatterjee, B. K. Chakrabarti, S. S. Manna, ”Pareto
Law in a Kinteic Model of Market with Random Saving
Propensity”, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Ap-
plications, vol.335, Issues 1–2, 155-163 (2004)
[3] P. Richmond, P. Repetowicz, S. Hutzler, ”Dynamics of
Money and Income Distributions”, Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 356, issue 2, 641-654
(2005)
[4] A. Chatterjee, B.K. Chakrabarti , ”Ideal-Gas Like Mar-
kets: Effect of Savings” In: A. Chatterjee, S. Yarlagadda,
B.K. Chakrabarti (eds) Econophysics of Wealth Distribu-
tions. New Economic Windows. Springer, Milano (2005)
[5] A. Dragulescu, V. Yakovenko, ”Statistical mechanics of
money”, Eur. Phys. J. B 17, 723–729 (2000)
[6] M. Patriarca, A. Chakraborti ,K. Kaski, G. Germano,
”Kinetic Theory Models for the Distribution of Wealth:
Power Law from Overlap of Exponentials”. In: A. Chat-
terjee, S. Yarlagadda, B.K. Chakrabarti (eds) ”Econo-
physics of Wealth Distributions”. New Economic Win-
dows. Springer, Milano (2005)
[7] M. Patriarca, K.Kaski, A.Chakraborti, ”A statistical
model with a standard gamma distribution”. Physical Re-
view E. 70. (2004)
[8] K.Bhattacharya, G.Mukherjee, S.Manna, ”Detailed Sim-
ulation Results for Some Wealth Distribution Models in
Econophysics”, arXiv.org, Quantitative Finance Papers.
(2005)
[9] E. Aydiner, A.G.Chertsvy, R. Metzler., ”Wealth distri-
bution, Pareto law, and stretched exponential decay of
money: Computer simulations analysis of agent-based
models”. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Appli-
cations. 490. issue C, 278-288 (2018)
Treball de Fi de Grau 5 Barcelona, January 2020
